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RESPONSES
A FISCAL CONSTITUTION WITH SUPERMAJORITY
VOTING RULES
ELIZABETH GARRETT*
The objective of Supermajority Rules as a Constitutional Solu-
tion1 is a laudable one: eschewing the court-centrism of most
legal scholarship, Professors McGinnis and Rappaport empha-
size the role of procedures in improving legislative outcomes and
enhancing the quality of congressional deliberation.' This per-
spective is not a new one for these authors. Both have written
extensively on supermajority voting rules in Congress,' and
Professor Rappaport has studied other political procedures that
implicate structural constitutional issues.4 Although their con-
clusions in Supermajority Rules are incomplete because they
neither examine supermajority requirements that have operated
for years to shape congressional deliberation nor assess the me-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I am grateful for the excel-
lent research assistance of Veronica Spicer (Chicago, Class of 2000) and Andrew
Leblanc (Harvard, Class of 1998) and the financial support of the Robert B. Roesing
Faculty Fund and the Unrestricted Faculty Fund at the University of Chicago Law
School.
1. John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a Consti-
tutional Solution, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 365 (1999).
2. See, e.g., id. at 373-74.
3. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legis-
lative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 Yale L.J. 483 (1995) [hereinafter
McGinnis & Rappaport, Constitutionality]; John 0. McGinnis & Michael B.
Rappaport, The Rights of Legislators and the Wrongs of Interpretation: A Further
Defense of the Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Rules, 47 DUKE L.J.
327 (1997) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport, The Rights of Legislators].
4. See, e.g., Michael B. Rappaport, The President's Veto and the Constitution, 87
Nw. U. L. REV. 735 (1993); Michael B. Rappaport, Veto Burdens and the Line Item
Veto Act, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 771 (1997).
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chanics of the modern budget process, their approach is one that
other scholars would do well to consider. The work of
courts-the traditional focus of legal scholarship and teach-
ing-is only a small part of the work of modern lawyers. The
issues addressed by legal scholarship must expand to account for
this shift. 5
Professors McGinnis and Rappaport identify several questions
relevant to an institutional analysis that appropriately recogniz-
es the role that all branches of the federal government play in
furthering constitutional and policy norms.' First, given the
strengths and weaknesses of the various institutions, which one
is better situated to vindicate particular constitutional values or
to construct solutions to specific policy problems? The authors
argue convincingly that certain "political" decisions, such as
those concerning the nation's fiscal policies, are ill-suited for ju-
dicial resolution and ought to be left primarily with the demo-
cratically accountable branches.' Enhanced procedures may be
required, however, to ensure that the legislative and executive
branches act consistently with constitutional principles in the
absence of aggressive judicial enforcement.
Second, can particular structures of decisionmaking work to
ameliorate deliberative failures that we observe in legislatures?
The authors identify several problems affecting congressional
5. Even court-centrists would do well to learn more about the legislative process
because so much of the judiciary's work concerns the interpretation of statutes. See
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 13-
14 (1997) ("By far the greatest part of what I and all federal judges do is to inter-
pret the meaning of federal statutes and federal agency regulations. Thus the subject
of statutory interpretation deserves study and attention in its own right, as the
principal business of judges and (hence) lawyers.").
6. For other work recognizing the role of entities other than the federal courts in
protecting constitutional norms, see Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55
NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
7. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 442. Others have made similar
arguments, particularly with respect to structural constitutional norms. See, e.g., AL-
EXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1986); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NA-
TIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE
SUPREME COURT (1980); Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Fore-
word. Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996).
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budget process that can be addressed through procedural re-
forms. First, the influence of interest groups can lead to legis-
lation benefitting a small part of society at great expense to the
diffuse mass of taxpayers who pay for the subsidy.' Legislators
facilitate such rent-seeking because they can capture some of the
rents; lawmakers know that their other constituents are unlike-
ly to discover the existence or magnitude of such deals.9 At the
least, this kind of interest group activity skews the distribution
of public resources away from the public interest. Policymakers
can work to devise procedures that either reduce interest group
influence, or, more realistically, harness interest group activity
to produce more public-regarding outcomes.' °
The authors further contend that multi-member bodies are of-
ten subject to collective action problems.1 For example, the bud-
get context is plagued by a prisoners' dilemma. In short, mem-
bers of Congress who individually think that "the public interest
is best served by reduced federal spending" also realize that
"most of their colleagues will not resist the temptation to
spend."'2 Indeed, it would not be rational for the individual
members to resist such a temptation: "The cost of government
programs is spread among millions of taxpayers, while the bene-
fits of federal spending can be concentrated on a few who will
reward their benefactors."" Even if voters choose to use elec-
tions as the appropriate mechanism to solve this problem, these
8. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 378-82.
9. See generally R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 28-
34 (1990) (discussing when the public is likely to pay attention to legislative action);
MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 172-87 (1964) (analyzing when
and how the larger public is likely to respond to legislative and political acts).
10. See AARON WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 179 (3d ed.
1979) ("The proponents of change might consider ways and means of structuring the
budgetary process so that their preferred strategies will turn out to be those which
participants find it advantageous to pursue."); see also Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing
Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U.
CH. L. REv. 501 (1998) (discussing how interest group activity can be structured to
reduce collective action problems, reach better budget outcomes, and provide informa-
tion available to government officials).
11. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 426-27.
12. Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political Safeguards of Federalism? The Un-
funded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1113, 1133 (1997).
13. Id.
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"voters are likely to hold all members responsible for increased
taxes or a higher deficit-not just the big spenders."'4 Procedural
frameworks can provide coordination to solve this dilemma.
Another way to frame this problem is as one of competing pri-
orities. Lawmakers and constituents have preferences concern-
ing the size of the federal budget, the method of financing gov-
ernment programs, and the larger objectives of the government.
They may consistently undermine those objectives, however,
when they make micro-level decisions about particular pro-
grams. Procedural frameworks work as precommitment devices
to make it more difficult for lawmakers to defect from their pri-
mary preferences to satisfy conflicting subsidiary ones. 5
Finally, procedures can provide legislators an opportunity to
deliberate important constitutional and policy issues in a way
that is transparent to the electorate. For example, procedures
requiring congressional entities to produce particular informa-
tion before floor debate may highlight issues that lawmakers
would otherwise overlook.' Of course, procedures cannot guar-
antee that deliberation will occur, or that the delay they produce
will be used solely to improve public discourse rather than to
block legislation for other reasons. Procedures may operate to
emphasize particular issues and decisions for the electorate,
14. Id-
15. For discussions of such precommitment devices, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE
PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 180-81 (1993); Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Par-
adox of Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY
AND SOCIAL CHANGE 195 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988). Conflicting prefer-
ences abound in the modern budget arena. See JOHN B. GILMOUR, RECONCILABLE
DIFFERENCES? CONGRESS, THE BUDGET PROCESS, AND THE DEFICIT 19 (1990) ("Con-
gress was constantly of two minds over the budget: supporting the programs and
opposing the total. Its conflicted state of mind led Congress to contradict itself re-
peatedly.").
16. See, e.g., Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 4022, 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. (112 Stat.) 685, 785-86 (to be codi-
fied at 26 U.S.C. § 8022) (requiring the Joint Tax Committee to disseminate Tax
Complexity Analyses for proposed tax laws in an effort to highlight concerns about
tax complexity); Garrett, supra note 12, at 1163-68 (discussing role of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act in ensuring that Congress considers the value of federalism).
The arguments Professors McGinnis and Rappaport offer concerning deliberation are
slightly different and more closely connected to their anti-federalist objectives. See
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 420-22.
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however, and the discussion such procedures spark may lead
to policies that are more consistent with public values and prior-
ities.17
A third question that the authors pose in their institutional
analysis, and a question that any study of congressional proce-
dures must consider, is one of fit. If we are to apply enhanced
procedures to particular kinds of legislation, perhaps because we
believe the consideration of these bills is susceptible to one or
more of the pathologies described above, how do we define the
universe of laws that such procedures will govern? As the au-
thors note, they are concerned with reducing the amount of pri-
vate interest legislation; thus, in an ideal world, they would im-
pose greater burdens, perhaps even absolute prohibitions, only
on such proposals.18 But, it is difficult to sort out private interest
bills from those serving the public interest, a situation that
makes absolute bans unappealing. The authors argue that
spending programs, other than those taking the form of tax ex-
penditures, unfunded intergovernmental mandates, or regula-
tions, comprise the set of proposals most likely to fall victim to
17. See Jon Elster, Strategic Uses of Argument, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESO-
LUTION 236, 250 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995) (calling this the "civilizing
force of hypocrisy"); David Miller, Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice, XL POL.
STUD. 54, 61 (1992) (special issue) ("Preferences that are not so much immoral as
narrowly self-regarding will tend to be eliminated by the process of public debate.");
see also AMY GUTANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 126
(1996) (arguing that although they are skeptical about the ability of open debate to
"transform self-interested claims into public-spirited ones," public discussion does
help to "rule out making arguments that one would not accept if others made
them"); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 56
(1996). Unger points out that
[slometimes, group selfishness may be tamed by being made to speak the
magnanimous rhetoric of social concern. If hypocrisy is the tribute that
vice renders virtue, this rhetoric may be usable as the device of a min-
imalist but realistic political morality. Just as often, however, self-dealing
through law may be more effectively controlled by being recognized for
what it is.
Id But see Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on
Civid Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1601
(1988) ("It simply is not possible to ensure that people are public-regarding merely
because they defend or rationalize their actions on those grounds [of public-regarding
verbiage].").
18. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 403-04.
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the process failures they list.19 Thus, they believe that greater
procedural hurdles are justified in this context.
We may not be convinced that the authors' definition ade-
quately fits their objectives-indeed, I argue that their category
is at least under-inclusive, and they admit it is over-inclu-
sive-but my point here is a more limited one. Their argument
that any procedural response should be tailored in part accord-
ing to the closeness of the fit is persuasive. In fact, their discus-
sion only begins to identify the variety of procedural protections
available. They emphasize two procedural responses: absolute
prohibitions and constitutional supermajority voting require-
ments.2 ° One can think of procedural protections as lying along a
spectrum with the two identified by Professors McGinnis and
Rappaport as among the strongest. The constitutional
supermajority requirement itself can be strengthened or weak-
ened depending on the threshold demanded for passage. Con-
gressional rules that can be changed by the House or Senate
with a majority vote offer less durable protection than constitu-
tional provisions.2' Such rules can create any number of hurdles
for legislation. Congressional rules can directly, or indirectly, re-
quire that supermajorities support enactment of particular
laws.22 Less stringent rules can require separate majority votes
19. See i- at 405-06.
20. See id at 434-35.
21. Virtually all congressional rules can be changed by a majority vote. Some, in-
cluding myself, have observed that the Senate rules concerning cloture and filibuster
can be changed only by a supermajority vote. See Catherine Fisk & Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 245-46 (1997); Elizabeth Garrett,
Term Limitations and the Myth of the Citizen-Legislator, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 623,
678 n.180 (1996). This claim may be overstated. The Senate has imposed limitations
on floor debate through proposals adopted by majority vote, such as in the case of
budget reconciliation bills that must come up for a vote after a certain number of
hours of floor debate. See SARAH A- BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH, POLITICS OR PRIN-
CIPLE? FILIBUSTERING IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE 23 (1997).
22. There is an ongoing debate about the constitutionality of congressional rules
requiring supermajority votes to enact particular kinds of legislation, such as the
House rule requiring a three-fifths vote to enact a tax rate increa se. For the prima-
ry contributions, see Bruce Ackerman et al., An Open Letter to Congressman
Gingrich, 104 YALE LJ. 1539 (1995); Susan Low Bloch, Congressional Self-Discipline:
The Constitutionality of Supermajority Rules, 14 CONST. COMMENTARY 1 (1997);
McGinnis & Rappaport, Constitutionality, supra note 3; McGinnis & Rappaport, The
Rights of Legislators, supra note 3; Jed Rubenfeld, Rights of Passage: Majority Rule
476 [Vol. 40:471
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on particular provisions in a bill to disaggregate parts of a
logrolled deal. 3 Where along the spectrum one locates the
amount of procedural protection in a particular case depends,
among other things, on the interests at stake, the flexibility re-
quired, and the closeness of the fit between the kinds of bills
affected and the relevant values. If one is not sure how to cali-
brate the level of protection with the values, choosing a con-
gressional rule allows for easier modification than is possible
with constitutional provisions.
Having applauded the authors' approach, I must take issue
with the analysis of their proposed reform of our "fiscal constitu-
tion."24 Their application of the analytical framework might have
been more convincing had they more closely studied and dis-
cussed the myriad supermajority voting rules, as well as other
countermajoritarian features, that currently shape congres-
sional decisionmaking, particularly in the budget context. More
broadly, a sophisticated awareness of budget rules reveals gaps
in their analysis and obstacles that could stand in the way of
their proposal's reaching its desired outcomes. In the remainder
in Congress, 46 DUKE L.J. 73 (1996). However, even those who argue against
supermajority requirements to pass legislation seem to suggest that procedural rules
with supermajority requirements can be adopted to enhance deliberation or to serve
other process values. See Ackerman et al., supra, at 1543 (noting, however, that the
filibuster rules are "vulnerable to our constitutional objection"); Bloch, supra, at 2
(distinguishing filibuster rule from presentment rule); Rubenfeld, supra, at 87 (not-
ing, similarly, that procedural rules do not alter the "rules of recognition"). The
three-fifths requirement, or a similar procedural rule, however, could always be re-
phrased as a point of order, such as those that permeate the budget process, and
apparently not trigger the constitutional concerns raised by legal scholars. Consider,
for example: "Any member can raise a point of order against legislation adding a
new tax rate or increasing tax rates. Such a point of order can be waived only by a
vote of three-fifths of the body to proceed with consideration of the bill." Further-
more, because supermajority rules can be changed or repealed in virtually all cases
by a majority vote, courts have been unwilling to find that lawmakers have standing
to challenge them. See Skaggs v. Carle, 110 F.3d 831, 835-36 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see
also Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 824-26 (1997) (articulating a stricter test for con-
gressional standing).
23. See Garrett, supra note 12, at 1166 (discussing such a rule in the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act).
24. Professor Dam coined this phrase to refer to the framework governing federal
fiscal decisions; some of the rules are in the federal Constitution, some are not. See
Kenneth W. Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. CHi. L. REv. 271, 271-72
(1977).
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of this Essay, I will provide more detailed information about
supermajority rules and the federal budget process, and I will
suggest how this data might affect the authors' conclusions.
I.
The most curious aspect of Professors McGinnis and
Rappaport's lengthy treatment of supermajority voting require-
ments for some spending bills is the virtual absence of discus-
sion of the plethora of supermajority voting rules governing con-
gressional deliberation and the many other countermajoritarian
aspects of legislative organization. I will not detail the latter,
but they are familiar to even the most casual observer of Con-
gress. For example, in virtually all cases, a committee compris-
ing only a few members must approve bills before floor consid-
eration.2" In the House of Representatives, the Rules Committee
must also agree to schedule the bill for consideration.26 Further-
more, as Lynn Baker and Samuel Dinkin have discussed, the
current allocation of representation in the Senate essentially
results in supermajoritarianism because of the disproportionate
power accorded to small states."
There are more obviously relevant examples of supermajority
voting requirements, very similar to the amendment proposed by
Professors McGinnis and Rappaport, save for the latter's status
as a constitutional provision. The recent academic debate about
25. See McGinnis & Rappaport, Constitutionality, supra note 3, at 499 ("[Like the
three-fifths rule, the committee system both promotes deliberation and impedes
majoritarian legislative control."); see also Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall,
The Industrial Organization'of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not
Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. EcoN. 132, 143-49 (1988) (explaining why congres-
sional members rely on a committee system).
26. See CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: A REFER-
ENCE, RESEARCH, AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDE 263 (1989).
27. See Lynn A. Baker & Samuel H. Dinkin, The Senate: An Institution Whose
Time Has Gone?, 13 J.L. & POL. 21, 24-25 (1997); see also Frank I. Michelman,
"Protecting the People From Themselves," or How Direct Can Democracy Be?, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1717, 1723-24 (1998) (arguing that inherent in the notion of our de-
mocracy is a number of countermajoritarian aspects to allow for deliberation about
outcomes and noting that "[tihe entire American constitutional system is primarily a
check-and-balance system, and a check-and-balance system is countermajoritarian,
designedly, without tears").
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such requirements began when the House of Representatives
adopted a rule mandating a three-fifths vote to pass a tax rate
increase." The Senate rules have long required a supermajority
vote to cut off a debate and bring a bill to a vote, 9 and the abili-
ty to filibuster a motion to consider a bill (in addition to the vote
on final passage) has given rise to the practice of Senate "holds."
Under current practice, one senator can place a hold on the con-
sideration of a nomination or a bill; the identity of the lawmaker
who is blocking the floor debate and vote is not revealed publicly
by Senate leaders in most cases. °
Most surprisingly, the McGinnis-Rappaport article omits any
consideration of the congressional experience with supermajority
voting requirements in the federal budget process. Many of the
congressional budget rules that structure decisionmaking are en-
forced through substantive points of order. When a member of
either body raises a point of order, that house must vote to
waive the objection before it can continue to consider the bill.31
Although the House Rules Committee waives most budget points
of order through special rules governing floor consideration,32 in
the Senate many such objections can be waived only by a vote of
sixty senators.33 For example, if passage of a spending bill would
28. See House Rule XXI(5)(c), H.R. Doc. No. 103-342, at 652-58 (1995), as amend-
ed by H.R. Res. 5, 105th Cong. (1997).
29. See Senate Rule XX (1998).
30. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 21, at 203-04; see also JoINT COMMTE
ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS., BACKGROUND MATERI-
ALS: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO MEMBERS OF THE JOINT COMM. ON
THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS 1071-78 (Comm. Print 1993) (considering effect of
filibusters of motions to proceed and possible reforms); Carroll J. Doherty, Senate
Caught in the Grip of its Own 'Holds' System, 1998 CONG. Q. 2241, 2241-43 (detail-
ing procedure and efforts to lift secrecy or modify practice).
31. See generally TIEFER, supra note 26, at 908-19 (discussing budget points of
order and waivers.)
32. The House has waived budget points of order over 600 times since the 1974
Act became effective. See How Did We Get Here From There: Reform of the Federal
Budget Process: Hearings Before the House Committee on the Budget, 104th Cong.,
2d Sess. 93 (1996) (prepared statement of Rep. Charles W. Stenholm); see also
TIEFER, supra note 26, at 915 (detailing waivers by the Rules Committee in the
97th and 98th Congresses).
33. See ALLEN ScHIcK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, PoLIcy, PROCESS 91
(1995); TIEFER, supra note 26, at 916; see also Anita S. Krishnakuynar, Note, Recon-
ciliation and the Fiscal Constitution: The Anatomy of the 1995-96 Budget "Train
1999] 479
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violate the limits set in the concurrent budget resolution, a point
of order enforced by the sixty-vote requirement is allowed; the
same is true if the budget resolution sets spending limits above
those allowed by the applicable federal budget act.34 Although
the Senate has met the supermajority requirement to waive bud-
get points of order, many objections have been sustained and re-
sulted in modifications to the underlying spending or revenue
bills.35
The congressional experience with these rules provides rich
empirical data to test the accuracy of Professors McGinnis and
Rappaport's predictions about the fiscal policy that would result
from their supermajority proposal. Have these supermajority
rules worked to screen out private interest spending more than
they have blocked programs serving the public interest? Have
they caused members of Congress to abide by their commitments
with regard to spending targets and the like? Compared to en-
forcement mechanisms that can be waived by majority votes or
by a special rule in the House,36 have supermajority constraints
yielded different outcomes?
In one of the authors' few references to the current budget
structure, they write that "when the pressure to choose among
programs became too great, the only automatic aspect of Gramm-
Wreck," 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 589, 615 (1998) (noting that the Senate has never
mustered the 60 votes required to waive an objection under the Byrd Rule).
34. See SCHICK, supra note 33, at 95 box 5-1 (listing some of the most important
budget points of order). The spending ceilings in the federal budget acts are enforced
through a sequester procedure. See HOWARD E. SHUMAN, POLITICS AND THE BUDGET:
THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 332-34 (3d ed. 1992) (de-
scribing the manner in which sequestration operates). If spending exceeds the cap,
the Office of Management and Budget must order uniform cuts in outlays for nonex-
empt federal programs. See generally STANLEY E. COLLENDER, THE GUIDE TO THE
FEDERAL BUDGET: FISCAL 1994, at 29-35 (1993) (noting the substantial power of the
Office of Management and Budget, in the context of sequestration, given by the Bud-
get Enforcement Act of 1990). Similarly, the statutory PAYGO requirements that
apply to revenue and entitlement bills are enforced through a sequester of nonex-
empt entitlement programs. See Garrett, supra note 10, at 510-11.
35. See TIEFER, supra note 26, at 916-18 (observing that there were few points of
order raised before the late 1980s, but discussing some contests that occurred after
adoption of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act).
36. New aspects of the federal budget process prohibit waiver of some points of
order through a special rule. See Garrett, supra note 12, at 1163 (distinguishing the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act points of order from other budget points of order).
480
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Rudman proved to be Congress's decision to eviscerate the stat-
ute."3" Certainly, it is true that Congress backed away from the
draconian deficit targets required in the original Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings bill and finally, in 1990, chose to control the
budget through spending targets rather than deficit measures.3 8
Congress did not, however, repeal the budget framework; in-
stead, it extended discipline to the revenue and entitlement por-
tion of the federal budget. Moreover, while the authors are cer-
tainly correct that Congress fell short of its original objectives, 9
they fail to mention another relevant empirical question. Did the
revised budget rules, many of which were enforced through
supermajority voting requirements in the Senate, improve the
fiscal situation relative to what it would have been in the ab-
sence of such controls? Most of those who study the federal bud-
get process believe that the rules have had some bite; congres-
sional spending patterns have been altered by this complicated
framework.40
Such an empirical analysis is warranted before the country
embarks on any scheme to change the Constitution in the way
the authors advocate. If Professors McGinnis and Rappaport
believe that current congressional rules imposing supermajority
requirements do not work, they need to explain why these rules
fail and why their proposal will succeed. Given their prior work,
we know they do not object to congressional supermajority rules
on constitutional grounds.41 Perhaps, as the above-quoted pas-
37. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 370.
38. See Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, 2 U.S.C. §§ 900-907 (1994).
39. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 369-70.
40. See, e.g., SCHICK, supra note 33 at 41 ("[PAYGO] has had a marked effect on
new legislation.... Congress has achieved substantial deficit reduction by increas-
ing revenue and cutting direct spending under existing law while also offsetting any
deficit increases resulting from new legislation."); Philip G. Joyce & Robert D.
Reischauer, Deficit Budgeting: The Federal Budget Process and Budget Reform, 29
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 429, 438 (1992) ("The PAYGO process seems to have discouraged
major efforts to increase entitlement spending or cut taxes or both."); James A.
Thurber, Twenty Years of Congressional Budget Reform, 25 PUB. MANAGER 6, 7
(1996) ("The primary impact of PAYGO [the budget rules applying to tax and enti-
tlement legislation] has been to discourage spending.").
41. See generally McGinnis & Rappaport, Constitutionality, supra note 3, at 483-
512 (defending supermajority requirements as consistent with a textual reading of
the Constitution and constitutional history); McGinnis & Rappaport, The Rights of
1999] 481
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sage suggests, they believe that congressional rules are not suffi-
ciently constraining. As they have argued previously, however,
the fact that most congressional rules-even those requiring
supermajority votes-can be changed, waived, or repealed by
majority vote does not render them toothless.42 Why do the au-
thors prefer the greater durability afforded by constitutional
rules, and is durability more important than the greater flexibil-
ity provided by congressional procedures?
Perhaps current rules have not worked as the authors envi-
sion a well-functioning fiscal constitution should because mem-
bers of Congress have learned how to evade their discipline.
Again, understanding the details of such evasive tactics is im-
portant to determine whether the McGinnis-Rappaport Amend-
ment is likely to meet its creators' stated objectives. As I will
discuss in the second part of this Essay, their proposal contains
loopholes that could allow Congress to continue current spend-
ing patterns-or, at the least, to fall short of meaningfully ad-
dressing the governmental failures the authors identify.
Before turning to a discussion of the federal budget that may
provide insight into some of the evasion possible under the
McGinnis-Rappaport Amendment, I will demonstrate more con-
cretely what a study of current supermajority rules might have
contributed to Professors McGinnis and Rappaport's analysis.
Take, for example, the filibuster-a procedure that can operate
to impose supermajority voting requirements on much of the
Senate's business. It provides a fertile area for empirical analy-
Legislators, supra note 3, at 327-49 (defending the three-fifths supermajority require-
ment for the passage of an income tax rate increase against an attack that the re-
quirement violates the Presentment Clause of the Constitution).
42. See McGinnis & Rappaport, The Rights of Legislators, supra note 3, at 345-46.
McGinnis and Rappaport explain:
Repealable supermajority rules nevertheless perform a useful func-
tion and cannot be dismissed as merely hortatory .... The repealability
of a rule does not in general make it ineffective: for instance, the com-
mittee system itself is established by repealable rules but no one doubts
its pervasive effects in shaping legislation. Supermajority rules in particu-
lar represent a public precommitment by the majority to a policy ....
While the supermajority rule may always be repealed, the public commit-
ment makes it more politically costly to do so than to simply vote [for
the underlying legislation].
Id. (footnote omitted).
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sis because it has been a feature of Senate debate for nearly 200
years.43 Moreover, Rule 22, which allows the Senate to invoke
cloture and limit floor debate, has been changed over the years,
and the right to filibuster has been suspended for entire classes
of legislation, such as some budget bills and many trade acts.44
Comparing the experience under the different procedural re-
gimes could allow the authors to prove their theoretical conten-
tion that supermajority voting rules would affect private-regard-
ing bills more harshly than legislation consistent with the public
interest.
Although my Essay will not provide the sort of empirical in-
quiry required to support or disprove this contention, a recent
study of the filibuster by Professors Binder and Smith casts
doubt on the accuracy of the McGinnis-Rappaport thesis. Binder
and Smith dispute the notion that the use of the filibuster "has
done little harm to the public welfare and has sometimes done
much good."' 5 It is common knowledge that filibusters by south-
ern senators blocked most civil rights legislation in this century,
even though many of these public-regarding proposals appear to
have had majority support.4'6 The list of all measures killed by
the filibuster since 1789 arguably includes at least as many pub-
lic-regarding proposals (e.g., antilynching bills, a genocide trea-
ty, campaign finance reform, and a lobbying disclosure proposal)
as it does private interest bills (e.g., President Clinton's 1993
supplemental appropriations bill and a bill to cut the capital
gains tax).4' Similarly, recent legislative actions that Binder and
Smith cite as having been influenced by the filibuster or the
threat to use it cannot fairly be characterized as overwhelmingly
or primarily rent-seeking. 4
Of course, these lists do not disprove the McGinnis-Rappaport
conclusion. The authors do not claim that proposals in the public
interest will be unaffected by supermajority voting require-
43. See, e.g., BINDER & SMITH, supra note 21, at 60-63.
44. See id at 188-95.
45. Id. at 127.
46. See iaL at 154-55.
47. See ict at 135 tbl.5-1.
48. See ir at 144 tbl.5-2.
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ments; their argument is substantially more sophisticated and
complex.49 Although the data provided by Professors Binder and
Smith may give us pause about accepting at face value the theo-
retical arguments of McGinnis and Rappaport's article, this em-
pirical work may not be sufficient to allow any firm conclusions.
For example, the threat of the filibuster has certainly affected
the course of more proposals than those that Binder and Smith
list. Procedures that come into play on the Senate floor affect
legislation in the early stages of drafting and committee consid-
eration-in the Senate and the House.50 It may well be impossi-
ble to get a sense of the full effect of supermajority voting re-
quirements because of this complex interaction,51 but a more
complete sense than that provided in McGinnis and Rappaport's
article is certainly possible with the aid of the congressional re-
cord, empirical studies of the filibuster, and interviews with par-
liamentarians and Senate staff.
Another difficulty with testing the McGinnis-Rappaport theo-
ries using past experience with similar rules is the absence of
any consensus definition of the public interest or of purely pri-
vate interest spending. "Pork" is in the eye of the beholder; a
private interest bill is often one that the commentator believes
to be bad policy.52 The difficulty of drawing lines here is one rea-
son questions of allocating federal resources are not susceptible
to principled resolution by courts. For example, the labels I ap-
49. See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 403-04.
50. See BINDER & SMITH, supra note 21, at 141-46.
51. See id. at 145 ("Because journalistic accounts generally do not address the
possibility of a filibuster until a bill emerges from committee, the list includes no
measures that were written or modified during initial committee action with a floor
filibuster in mind.").
52. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Bottom Line on the Line-Item Veto Act of 1996,
6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLVY 233, 238 (1997) (noting that pork is just an unattrac-
tive example of legislating for diverse interests "which is the very stuff of represen-
tative government"); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should
Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 89 (1985) ("All legislation and all
legislator-constituency relationships are 'pure pork barrel.'"); Mathew D. McCubbins,
Note, Budget Policy-Making and the Appearance of Power, J.L. ECON. & ORG. 133,
150 (Special Issue 1990) (noting that "pork" is a contested label and the classifica-
tion is often used as a political device against disfavored spending); James Q. Wil-
son, Democracy Needs Pork to Survive, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 1997, at A12 (stating
that "pork is the necessary glue that holds political coalitions together").
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plied above may be contested-some may not agree that a cut in
the capital gains tax rate is undesirable or that all the civil
rights laws that were killed by filibusters were in the public
interest.
The authors realize that the line between the two kinds of
legislation is a tricky one to draw,53 but I think it is even harder
than they indicate. Take, for example, transfer payments to the
elderly-a program they characterize as spending to benefit a
private interest notwithstanding the tremendous popular sup-
port enjoyed by programs like Social Security and Medicare.54
Certainly, such programs are nearly invincible in part because
of the support of interest groups like the AARP. 5 In addition,
however, Americans support some kind of public retirement and
health insurance programs both to provide them a guaranteed
source of income in the future and to reduce the current finan-
cial burden of older relatives.56 Moreover, given the cognitive
limitations that lead people to undervalue their needs in future
years relative to present ones, some sort of mandatory savings
program may be necessary to solve an inevitable failure of ra-
tionality.57 I am not arguing here that subsidies for the elderly
are necessarily in the public interest; indeed, I share the au-
thors' concern that these transfer programs, particularly as they
are now constructed, may be inefficient in some cases and cause
unacceptable inequities across generations. I am merely pointing
out the difficulty in characterizing particular programs as sup-
porting or undermining the public interest.
At another point in their article, Professors McGinnis and
Rappaport distinguish public-regarding from private-regarding
53. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 378 n.38.
54. See iL at 380-81, 411-13.
55. See id
56. See C. EUGENE STEUERLE & JON M. BAKIJA, RETOOLING SOCIAL SECURITY FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY: RIGHT & WRONG APPROACHES TO REFORM 27-28 (1994).
57. See RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING & OLD AGE 295 (1995). Posner explains:
Compelled savings for retirement . . . may reflect society's unwillingness
to treat the current [younger] self as the "owner," for all purposes, of the
body of which he is the temporary tenant .... This is just another ex-
ample of the propensity of the young self to weight his own utility much
more heavily than that of his future old self.
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bills on the basis of their level of support. They suggest that
bills serving the public interest are likely to have greater sup-
port than rent-seeking legislation and thus are more likely to
survive a supermajority vote.5" Again, a casual glance at the leg-
islative process might make one skeptical about the accuracy of
this assertion. For example, tax and appropriations bills with
widely distributed private interest benefits, pejoratively referred
to as "Christmas trees" because they provide goodies for so many
interest groups, often command nearly unanimous bipartisan
support.59 Government ethics proposals, on the other hand, take
several years, and sometimes decades, to overcome filibusters
and other countermajoritarian threats. The most recent example
of a proposal loaded with special interest giveaways-the Tax-
payer Relief Act of 1997-passed by a substantial margin in
both houses.60 Although it was not susceptible to the threat of a
filibuster in the Senate (because it was passed as a reconcilia-
tion bill), proponents would have faced no difficulty getting the
necessary votes for cloture.
In the end, the dynamics of the legislative process do not lead
me to accept without further proof the rosy picture presented by
the authors concerning the effect of supermajority voting re-
quirements. Increasing the hurdles in the way of passing legisla-
tion raises the costs of enactment. Such a move will price some
interest groups out of the market, but a comparison of the bene-
fits interest groups receive from federal legislation with the
money they presently spend to influence Congress strongly sug-
gests that many will be willing to meet the higher costs.6 In-
58. See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 416 ("[I]t is normally as-
sumed that the more votes a piece of legislation receives, the better the legisla-
tion.").
59. See generally SHUMAN, supra note 34, at 144-47 (explaining the meaning of
the term "Christmas tree" bills and commenting on the problems they cause).
60. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 passed by a vote of 253 to 197 in the House
of Representatives and by a vote of 92 to 8 in the Senate. See 143 CONG. REC.
S8480 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1997); 143 CONG. REC. H4815-16 (daily ed. June 26, 1997).
61. For example:
[T]he 1993 tax bill included targeted relief for the real estate indus-
try estimated to reduce federal revenues by $9.1 billion over the first five
years of enactment, and the provisions were worth much more than that
to realtors, contractors, investors and related industries. In 1992 through
1994, however, real estate interests contributed only $29.7 million to the
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deed, supermajority voting requirements may increase the
amount of special interest legislation as lawmakers work to as-
semble larger coalitions. As Daniel Shaviro has observed in not-
ing the indeterminate effect of supermajority voting rules (in the
context of requiring such a vote to approve deficit spending):
The need to assemble a 60 percent coalition might increase
the amount of logrolling that was necessary. Suppose that 51
percent of the House was willing to approve a $200 billion
deficit, which in fact would result from the programs in place,
but that getting to 60 percent required the leadership to woo
extra votes by agreeing to additional spending programs and
targeted tax cuts.
6 2
The key question concerns the preferences of lawmakers whose
votes are required to make up the difference between majority
support and supermajority support. If they demand increased
special interest spending that does not impose concentrated
costs on the constituents of others (as deficit spending and other
financing methods can allow), the effect of the McGinnis-
Rappaport Amendment may be more spending and a larger fed-
eral government.
campaign coffers of members of Congress.
Garrett, supra note 10, at 548 (footnotes omitted). The $29.7 million figure may be
somewhat understated. See id at 548-49.
62. DANIEL SHAvm o, Do DEFICITS MATTER? 258 (1997); see also Saul Levmore,
Bicameralism: When Are Two Decisions Better than One?, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
145, 155 (1992) (hypothesizing that supermajoritarianism would result in "more
wasteful rent-seeking and corruption than does bicameralism"); cf Einer R. Elhauge,
Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J.
31, 90-91 (1991) (describing conditions under which a system that imposes higher
transactions costs could increase interest group activity). Similar observations have
been made in the context of enactment of a presidential line item veto; the price of
the President's support may be additional spending that he supports. See generally
Lawrence Lessig, Lessons from a Line Item Veto Law, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1659, 1659 (1997) (supporting the proposition that any line item veto law must be
accompanied by a Balanced Budget Amendment to be effective); Aaron Wildavsky,
Item Veto Without a Global Spending Limit: Locking the Treasury after the Dollars
have Fled, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcS & PUB. PoLY 165, 175-76 (1985) (making the
argument that, in the absence of a global spending limit, a line item veto would
only exacerbate the problems it was intended to resolve); Edward A. Zelinsky, The
Unsolved Problem of the Unfunded Mandate, 23 Omo N.U. L. REv. 741, 746 (1997)
(making a similar point with respect to supermajority voting requirements in un-
funded mandates context).
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I raise only a few concerns here-concerns that could be vali-
dated or put to rest by more detailed empirical analysis. Other
questions no doubt occur to the reader (and occurred to the au-
thors), such as whether programs to benefit the powerless and
relatively unrepresented in society will be able to surmount ad-
ditional obstacles to enactment. Which groups are more likely to
pay the higher cost for federal legislation: groups like the elder-
ly, which the authors describe as already disproportionately
powerful and able to amass consensus support for their entitle-
ment programs, or the poor who must rely on policy entrepre-
neurs, service providers, and altruists to enact their programs?
The authors assert that the latter group will not be unduly
harmed by their proposal,63 but they do not support this hopeful
conclusion with, say, an analysis of past years' experience with
reforms of means-tested entitlements compared to efforts to pare
back middle-class entitlements. Other scholars have concluded,
contrary to the optimistic assessment of Professor McGinnis and
Rappaport, that procedures increasing transactions costs in the
legislative process empower dominant interest groups at the ex-
pense of the public good.64 Such gaps in the discussion of the
effects of supermajority rules can be closed, or at least narrowed,
in future work in which the authors take advantage of the rich
history of congressional supermajority rules and their interac-
tion with the congressional process and interest group politics.
II.
One likely reason that current budget supermajority voting
rules have not operated as Professors McGinnis and Rappaport
would like their constitutional provision to work is that lawmak-
ers and potential beneficiaries have circumvented fiscal disci-
pline. The authors suggest as much when they observe that Con-
gress quickly replaced the harsh budget rules imposed by
63. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 461-64.
64. Professor Mashaw notes that organized and powerful interest groups are adept
at using procedures to block action that a majority might favor. See JERRY L.
MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS & GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC
LAW 72 (1997).
488 [Vol. 40:471
A FISCAL CONSTITUTION
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings with less binding requirements." Per-
haps Professors McGinnis and Rappaport believe that Congress
evaded the deficit caps because they were statutory provisions
rather than constitutional mandates. I suspect, however, that
most of the circumvention of the modern budget framework oc-
curs when sophisticated interest groups and experienced law-
makers devise ways to enact generous federal benefits within
the letter of the law. Professors McGinnis and Rappaport have
worked to reduce the loopholes in their proposal-for example,
they apply supermajority rules to spending rather than to par-
ticular means of financing government spending-but the con-
gressional experience since 1974 suggests they have not plugged
all the holes. Of course, this article is the first version of their
proposal; as the authors continue to draft their new budget
framework, they will need to confront several challenges,66 three
of which I will mention here.
First, the article does not adequately address a nettlesome
question for budget policymakers-the question of the appropri-
ate baseline from which to measure annual changes in spending.
Recognizing the problem of holdouts in the context of enacting a
federal budget,6 7 Professors McGinnis and Rappaport include a
default rule to allow the government to enact spending bills by a
majority vote as long as they "spend ninety percent or less than
the amount spent in the previous year."68 Among the problems
that might arise with this rule69 is confusion about how to mea-
65. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 370.
66. A good example of the kinds of questions and concerns that a painstaking re-
view of the details of such proposals can raise is Theodore P. Seto, Drafting a Fed-
eral Balanced Budget Amendment that Does What It Is Supposed to Do (And No
More), 106 YALE L.J. 1449 (1997).
67. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 420-22.
68. Id. at 423.
69. The rather complicated and opaque description of how the supermajority re-
quirement would work in practice (in a process with 13 separate appropriations bills
and other entitlement legislation in any fiscal year) suggests that the authors need
to work out the mechanism for coordinating the new budget process further. See
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 424-27 & n.239. For example, could Con-
gress continue to pass appropriations bills by a majority vote as long as the total
amount of spending authorized by spending laws remained under the 90% cap? Such
a procedure would encourage a race to pass the first appropriations bills, thereby
crowding out the later bills that would require supermajority votes to pass. See Kate
Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76
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sure "the amount spent in the previous year," the baseline
against which permissibte future spending is measured. Profes-
sors Mark Crain and Nicole Verrier Crain describe the impor-
tance of budget baselines:
At an elementary level a budget baseline defines what is
meant by the terms "increase" and "cut."... What is the
proper starting point for judging a budget's effects is the es-
sence of the baseline 'debate. The two main choices for a bud-
get baseline are the dollars spent the year before or the level
of services that those dollars bought, which is labeled a "cur-
rent services" baseline. For example, in the US the federal
budget procedure for computing the current services level
takes what was spent in the year before, adjusts it for infla-
tion and, in the case of programs like Social Security or un-
employment compensation, for the number of people projected
to be eligible in the year ahead, and that becomes the base-
line.7 °
CAL. L. REV. 593, 657-59 (1988) (detailing the way GRH affected the timing of ap-
propriations bills). The authors indicate that a concurrent budget resolution, which is
not legally binding, might set the terms of the subsequent spending bills with suffi-
cient specificity to coordinate the process. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1,
at 423-25. Experience with the concurrent resolution casts doubt on the effectiveness
of such a coordination device. Currently, budget resolutions provide aggregate figures
about total spending and revenue, and the accompanying committee reports parcel
out portions of the discretionary funds to the appropriations subcommittees. Details
of the spending programs are not included in the budget resolution itself, nor are
any programmatic suggestions by the budget committees in their reports binding on
appropriators. See Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in
the Federal Budget Process, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 387, 398-99 (1998). In part, this
arrangement stems from the ability of appropriators to protect their committees' turf
from incursion by new congressional players. It also results from the inability of
lawmakers to set macrolevel objectives at the same time they discuss the conse-
quences on the particular spending programs that affect their constituents. See id. at
411-12; see also Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as
a Positive Influence in Political Institutions, 88 MICH. L. REv. 917, 922-23 (1990)
(discussing the benefits of a "real-world veil of ignorance-a state of imperfect infor-
mation . . . that can reduce self-interest in social decisionmaking processes"). Fur-
thermore, even these generally phrased concurrent resolutions tend to pass by very
narrow margins in party-line voting; it seems unlikely that more specific documents
would be able to command supermajority support. See SCHICK, supra note 33, at 79-
81.
70. W. Mark Crain & Nicole Verrier Crain, Fiscal Consequences of Budget
Baselines, 67 J. PUB. ECON. 421, 421-22 (1998). Indeed, it is even more complex
than this passage suggests because there are several ways to measure what the
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McGinnis and Rappaport indicate that they would measure
against the actual dollars spent in the previous years, rather
than the adjusted current services baseline.71 If that is the case,
their amendment should specify precisely their preference be-
cause it is a change from budget practice that has long used
some form of the current services baseline. The Congressional
Budget Act of 1974 defines the budget baseline to be "the esti-
mated budget outlays and proposed budget authority that would
be included in the budget for the following fiscal year if pro-
grams and activities of the United States Government were car-
ried on during that year at the same level as the current fiscal
year without a change in policy."72 Lawmakers have used this
definition to justify the construction of a baseline with the fol-
lowing features: increased discretionary spending to account for
inflation; increased entitlement spending to account for inflation,
other increases in cost, and changes in caseloads; and sometimes
increased spending to reflect phased-in benefits.
The idea of a current services baseline may seem strange un-
til one considers the purpose of the measure. A baseline is a way
to measure change, and one relevant change is that of policy.
Has the government made decisions that reduce or increase the
level of services it is providing to citizens? Unless changes in the
cost of providing the same level of services are factored into the
baseline, lawmakers will find it difficult to isolate the effect of
new government policy. Supporters of using current services
baselines argue they are policy-neutral.7 4 Whatever the theoreti-
cal justification, budget baselines have been used to mislead the
Crains refer to as the current services baseline. See JOHN F. COGAN ET AL., THE
BUDGET PUZZLE: UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL SPENDING 126-29 (1994) (distinguishing
among current services, current policy, and current law).
71. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 422-23.
72. 31 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (describing the budget submission of the President); see
also OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 1999, at 275 (1998) (providing the
current services estimates).
73. Technically, this baseline is a current policy baseline, but it is usually referred
to as current services. See COGAN ET AL., supra.note 70, at 128 tbl. B.1.
74. See id. at 43-44 (describing defense of current services baseline by the Senate
Budget Committee).
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public (and perhaps to confuse some lawmakers) about the bud-
getary effect of legislation." For example, the recent political
battles over proposed "cuts" in Medicare were, in reality, fights
over how much federal spending would increase over the actual
dollars spent the year before.76 Claims of reducing federal spend-
ing are easier to make in a world of current services baselines
because nominal spending can increase even with substantial
reductions from projected baselines.
The current services baseline has come under attack because
it is so amenable to gamesmanship7 and because it entrenches
current spending priorities by institutionalizing a presumption
in favor of higher spending for those already receiving federal
benefits.78 There are several proposals pending before Congress
to require lawmakers to use last year's actual spending as the
baseline for comparison.79 In 1995, the House passed a Truth-in-
Budgeting Baseline Reform as an amendment to the House
rules.8 0 Under this new rule, the baseline estimates would not
include an adjustment for inflation for programs and activities
subject to discretionary appropriations. For entitlement spend-
ing, if proposed legislation provides a lower rate of increase in
spending than under current law, the cost estimate will show
that spending is increasing under the proposed legislation, al-
though less so than it would under current law; previously, the
cost estimate would show only a reduction from current law.8'
Unless the proposed constitutional amendment requires a spe-
cific baseline (or if the wording allows Congress any discretion
75. See id at 42.
76. See id at 41.
77. See id. at 45-70 (describing numerous ways budget baselines can be manipu-
lated); DONALD F. KETTL, DEFICIT POLITICS: PUBLIc BUDGETING IN ITS INSTITUTIONAL
AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT 115-17 (1992) (noting the problems that using a baseline
causes in budgeting).
78. See Crain & Crain, supra note 70, at 423; see also id at 434 (concluding,
through a study of state budgets, that current services baselines increase the growth
rate in state spending relative to states using last year's spending level).
79. See, e.g., H.R. 1372, 105th Cong., § 203 (1997) (requiring that the "starting
point" for budgets be "the level of outlays for the current fiscal period"); H.R. 4837,
105th Cong., § 612 (1998) (amending language in budget act to require the President
and Congress to use "budgetary levels for the preceding fiscal year" as baseline).
80. See House Rule XIII(7)(a)(3), H.R. REP. No. 104-868 (1996).
81. See id-
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in selecting a baseline 2 ), lawmakers almost certainly will use
some kind of current services estimate so that they can meet the
ninety percent default rule without drastically cutting govern-
ment services. Depending on the assumptions they use to con-
struct the baseline (such as the projected increase in the cost of
living, medical costs, and unemployment), lawmakers might be
able to meet the ninety percent requirement with no real reduc-
tion in the size of the federal government. Budget figures, such
as those used in the current services estimates, are extremely
sensitive to the economic assumptions on which they are based. 3
Lawmakers wishing to evade the discipline of the default rule
can use the most favorable assumptions within the range of rea-
sonable estimates and allow for significant increases in the actu-
al dollars spent. In a regime in which so much hinges on budget
forecasts and economic assumptions, we should not be surprised
if these seemingly "neutral" technical presentations become po-
liticized ways for lawmakers and beneficiaries to preserve cur-
rent arrangements under new, seemingly foolproof restrictions.8"
If the McGinnis-Rappaport Amendment explicitly and precise-
ly demands a baseline of last year's dollars (perhaps with adjust-
ments for growth in the number of beneficiaries of entitlement
programs), the authors are proposing a real reduction in the size
of government larger than the ten percent figure suggests. The
federal government will be forced to reduce government services
drastically-much more than ten percent-to operate with nine-
ty percent of the actual dollars they used the year before. The
authors never mention this significant change from current
82. The choice of a budget baseline is the kind of decision that a court is unlikely
to countermand even if the amendment is drafted to require last year's spending as
the relevant starting point. See RICHARD BRIFFAULT, BALANCING ACTS: THE REALITY
BEHIND STATE BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENTS 37-40 (1996) (describing state experi-
ence).
83. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 72, at 12-14, 14 tbl. 1-6
(discussing and demonstrating the sensitivity of the budget to economic assump-
tions).
84. See, e.g., Michael D. Bopp, The Roles of Revenue Estimation and Scoring in
the Federal Budget Process, 56 TAx NOTES 1629 (1992) (examining the process of
revenue estimation and how it can be manipulated for political purposes); Michael J.
Graetz, Paint-By-Nunibers Tax Lawmaking, 95 COLUm. L. REV. 609 (1995) (discuss-
ing politicization of revenue estimates and distributional analyses of revenue bills).
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baseline conventions. Given the arcane nature of budget
baselines, an explanation of the consequences of their choice is
required for informed decisionmaking.
Second, just like the current budget process, Professors
McGinnis and Rappaport rely on cash flow measure of outlays in
implementing spending discipline." They acknowledge that
cash-flow accounting has been criticized" as not only an inaccu-
rate measure of federal spending, but also as especially manipu-
lable by policymakers seeking to evade expenditure con-
straints.87 For example, lawmakers wishing to enact a new enti-
tlement program can phase it in so that most of the spending is
postponed past the current fiscal year, and so that the spending
automatically occurs without further legislative action. Because
cash-flow accounting turns on outlays but appropriations bills
speak in terms of budget authority, Congress can pass bills with
substantial amounts of budget authority that could be obligated
by agencies now but spent in later fiscal years.8 8 Moreover, cash-
flow accounting has been indicted as a cause of short-sighted
policy.89 To comply with cash-flow measures, lawmakers will
eschew solutions that may save money in the long run because
they require immediate outlays.9" The use of cash-flow account-
85. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 450. The exception to cash-flow
accounting in the current budget process is discretionary credit programs, which
since 1990 have been displayed in the budget on a net present value basis rather
than as federal outlays occur. See Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, tit. XIH,
§ 13201(a), 2 U.S.C. § 661 (1994).
86. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 450.
87. See SHAVIRO, supra note 62, at 104-05; Garrett, supra note 10, at 527-30; see
also Jane G. Gravelle, Estimating Long-Run Revenue Effects of Tax Law Changes,
19 E. ECON. J. 481 (1993) (exploring the complexities of projecting the impact of
alterations in the tax structure into the future).
88. Budget authority is the authority of federal agencies to enter into obligations
that will result, either immediately or in the future, in budget outlays. See SHUMAN,
supra note 34, at 345. Agencies cannot make outlays (actual expenditures) without
first receiving budget authority. See id at 345-46. Budget authority in one fiscal
year may result in outlays many years in the future if the obligation that arises is
a long-term one (e.g., construction of a building or of weapons systems). See SCHICK,
supra note 33, at 21 exh.2-1. Thus, outlays in any one year can be traced to budget
authority provided in many prior fiscal years as well as the current one.
89. See, e.g., Seto, supra note 66, at 1484 (describing effect of short-term perspec-
tive on government efforts to reform Social Security).
90. See, e.g., Ron Feldman, How Weak Recognition and Measurement in the Fed-
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ing, rather than some form of measurement that considers the
present value cost of federal decisions, seems particularly
strange because Professors McGinnis and Rappaport are dis-
mayed at the extent of future unfunded obligations relating to
federal retirement and health programs for the elderly.91
In the end, I agree with the authors that cash-flow accounting
is the only currently feasible way to measure most government
spending. It is imperfect, and budgeters should work to move to
more accurate yardsticks, particularly with respect to programs
like Social Security.12 Until policymakers are more comfortable
with the accuracy of the economic assumptions undergirding
present value or generational measures, change is unlikely. My
point is only that cash-flow accounting allows lawmakers to
game the system through the use of timing gimmicks-by delay-
ing benefits until future fiscal years, they can pass larger pro-
grams than the rules of the fiscal constitution would seem to
allow.
Acknowledging this possibility, the authors note that their
ninety percent rule would work to reduce some of the gains from
timing gimmicks. 93 If spending is postponed a year, for example,
the outlays will count against the ninety percent ceiling in that
subsequent year and crowd out any new spending that cannot
obtain supermajority support.94 Of course, the success of this
safeguard depends again on the baseline. Some forms of current
services baselines include spending required by phased-in legis-
lation that results in outlays in future years. In other words,
because higher spending is part of the baseline, it is not consid-
ered an increase in spending. If the ninety percent figure were
applied to such a baseline, members would have a great incen-
eral Budget Encouraged Costly Policy: The Case of "Supervisory Goodwill," PUB.
BUDGETING & FIN. 31 (1996) (arguing that cash accounting led to short-sighted pol-
icies to deal with the savings and loan crisis in the 1980s).
91. See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 368, 387, 450-51.
92. See, e.g., H.R. 4837, tit. V, § 602, 105th Cong. (1998) (requiring accrual ac-
counting method for federal insurance programs); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
BUDGET ISSUES: INCORPORATING AN INVESTMENT COMPONENT IN THE FEDERAL BUD-
GET (GAO/AIMD-94-40) (1993) (discussing alternate budget procedures to account
more accurately for investments that will increase long-term productivity).
93. See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 423.
94. See id
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tive to delay spending, thereby significantly increasing the base-
line with future projected outlays.
Even if the McGinnis-Rappaport Amendment could be drafted
so tightly as to eliminate Congress's ability to manipulate
baselines, lawmakers would still have an incentive to pass de-
layed spending programs as a second-best solution if they could
not surmount the supermajority vote hurdle. After all, the en-
acted programs would have first dibs on federal spending; al-
though the ninety percent rule might require some cuts in pro-
grams, they would be locked in for part of the money. In a way,
interest groups would purchase a lottery ticket for a chance to
receive federal resources in the future. They would have a better
chance than those not yet holding tickets, and if programs were
cut uniformly to reach the ninety percent mark, they would re-
ceive at least some portion of the benefits. Moreover, they would
take a chance that the legislature, the executive, and the judi-
ciary would not enforce the constitutional provision, or that eco-
nomic conditions would cause lower outlays for entitlement pro-
grams, thereby freeing up room under the cap. Or, perhaps Con-
gress would be more likely to meet the supermajority re-
quirement when beneficiaries lobbied them to preserve previous-
ly enacted benefits; the mere existence of a program might in-
crease the clout of these groups. 5 Certainly, interest groups
would value these lottery-like benefits less than sure bets, but a
chance to receive some federal money is worth more than no
program at all.
Third, and most important, the McGinnis-Rappaport defini-
tion of spending includes only discretionary spending, appropri-
ated periodically by Congress, and new entitlement legislation.s6
Indirectly, the proposal may also constrain spending under pre-
viously enacted entitlement programs because such outlays
would count against the ninety percent cap, which, if exceeded,
95. See KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 395-96 (1986) (positing that interest groups are more effective
in defensive posture); Garrett, supra note 10, at 522 (describing why groups de-
fending an existing program are in a stronger position than those seeking new pro-
grams).
96. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 423 n.234.
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would trigger the supermajority voting requirement.9 7 "Spend-
ing" does not, however, include unfunded intergovernmental
mandates 8 or tax expenditures.9 Such gaps in coverage threat-
en to undermine the McGinnis-Rappaport Amendment. For ex-
ample, the growth in unfunded federal mandates imposing on
states and localities the responsibility for financing federal pro-
grams has been linked to the enactment of budget process acts
that have restricted federal lawmakers' ability to use deficit fi-
nancing.0 0 For purposes of this Essay, I will illustrate this kind
of circumvention by focusing on the authors' failure to include
tax expenditures as "spending."
Many federal programs can be constructed either as direct
federal subsidies or as tax subsidies that encourage particular
behavior by reducing an entity's tax liability.' For example,
Congress can hand out money through federal grants to those
who buy homes, or it can enact the mortgage interest deduction
97. See id. at 422-23.
98. Unfunded mandates, most simply, are "federal laws that impose duties on
state and local governments without providing federal grants to pay for them." Note,
Recent Legislation: Congress Requires a Separate, Recorded Vote for Any Provision
Establishing an Unfunded Mandate, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1469, 1469 (1996); see also 2
U.S.C. § 658(5)(A)(i) (Supp. I 1995) (defining intergovernmental mandate for purposes
of an aspect of the federal budget process-the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
("UMRA7)).
99. The 1974 Budget Act defines tax expenditures as "revenue losses attributable
to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or
deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of
tax, or a deferral of tax liability." 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (1994). McGinnis and Rappaport
also note that they do not include regulation of private entities as spending, see
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 428, although in some cases such laws can
be a method of enacting a federal program and requiring private entities to foot the
bill. Interestingly, UMRA requires congressional committees to produce some infor-
mation about the cost of regulations, which it defines as private sector mandates.
See 2 U.S.C. § 658b (c), (d) (Supp. I 1995). Senator Abraham has proposed extend-
ing UMRA's discipline to allow members to raise a point of order against any pri-
vate sector mandate that is not accompanied by federal funding, presumably, such
an objection could be lodged against virtually any significant federal regulatory stat-
ute. See S. 389, 105th Cong. (1997).
100. See Garrett, supra note 12, at 1134.
101. For classic discussions, see STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. McDANIEL, TAX Ex-
PENDITURES (1985); Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing
Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV.
L. REv. 705 (1970).
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to provide homeowners with the same financial incentive. In
some cases, tax expenditures are less efficient than direct pay-
ments."2 In other cases, policymakers prefer to use the tool of a
tax subsidy, such as in the case of the charitable deduction, be-
cause the tax provision allows for decentralized decisions about
how to allocate resources to eleemosynary causes.' 3 Spending
through the tax code is a significant part of the federal govern-
ment; one recent estimate puts the revenue loss from tax expen-
ditures at $531 billion in fiscal year 1999.104 Although con-
straints enacted as part of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990
have slowed the creation of new tax expenditures, tax subsidies
remain popular with interest groups in part because they, like
entitlement programs, grow automatically and without any for-
malized oversight by Congress."0 5 Indeed, some commentators
have observed that the tax code may be among the most active
sites of interest group activity and rent-seeking in the legislative
arena.
0 6
The authors' explanation for their decision to exclude tax ex-
penditures is not entirely convincing. First, they argue that the
public perceives tax subsidies as different from other spending
programs, and this difference results in a more negative view
towards special interest giveaways through the tax code.0 7 Their
102. For example, many have criticized the exclusion from income of interest on
municipal bonds on this ground. See, e.g., Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Re-
assessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155, 1161-62.
103. See, e.g., Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Charitable Contributions: A Policy Perspective,
50 Mo. L. REV. 85 (1985).
104. See Christopher Bergin, Spending Through the Code-The Top Ten Tax Expen-
ditures, 78 TAX NOTES 795 (1998) (using budget documents to arrive at that figure);
see also STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., EsTIMATES OF FED-
ERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FIScAL YEARS 1998-2002 (Comm. Print 1997) (falling to
provide an estimate of the total revenue lost through tax expenditures because of
potential interactions among provisions).
105. See Garrett, supra note 10, at 514-69 (discussing effect of PAYGO rules on
creation of new tax subsidies and indirect effects on the oversight of existing ones).
106. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETz, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX
277, 288 (1997); FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT Ex-
TRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 62-66 (1997); J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru
Nakazato, Tax Transitions and the Protection Racket: A Reply to Professors Graetz
and Kaplow, 75 VA. L. REV. 1155 (1989); William F. Shughart, Durable Tax Reform,
7 CATo J. 273, 274 (1987).
107. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 431 & n.263.
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claim is an empirical one and one that has been contested. Some
scholars and political observers have argued that tax expendi-
tures prompt less public outcry because they do not seem like
federal spending; instead, they allow people who qualify to pay
less tax, a goal avidly pursued by many." 8 Indeed, most who
study and compare the different kinds of government spending
conclude that tax expenditures are often favored by
policymakers because they are significantly less visible to the
general public than appropriations or direct spending.0 9
Certainly, at some level, a tax code riddled with preferences,
particularly those that benefit the well-to-do and holders of capi-
tal, can provoke public outcry that leads to sweeping tax reform.
The 1986 Tax Reform Act, which eliminated many tax preferenc-
es and lowered tax rates, can be seen in part as driven by such
concerns." Taxpayers are overwhelmingly supportive, however,
of so-called middle-class tax expenditures, such as those for edu-
108. See STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX
EXPENDITURES 1-2 (1973) (stating that people do not accept the equivalence between
one dollar in tax expenditure and one dollar in direct expenditure, minimizing the
former in most cases); SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 101, at 104-05 (arguing that
tax expenditures are less visible to the public than traditional spending programs);
JOHN F. WrrrE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 348-
52 (1985) (noting that the survey responses depend on the questions-i.e., whether
the provisions are called loopholes-and that provisions benefitting corporations are
viewed less favorably although not entirely negatively); see also 142 CONG. REC.
S5252 (daily ed. May 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Domenici) ("What are tax expen-
ditures and corporate loopholes? Frankly, there are two ways to look at it. One way
to think about it is they were taxes that the Government owned, and we said we
are not going to collect them. That is a Democrat version of a tax expenditure. The
other version is they belong to the taxpayer and not the Government."); 132 CONG.
REC. 5842 (1986) (statement of Harry K. Wells) ("[S]ome personal tax deductions in-
cluding interest paid on home mortgages are being referred to as tax expenditures
to the taxpayer, an interesting turn of phrase. Clearly indicating the idea, it's the
government's money that they are expending on you-a pretty scarey [sic] prospect
for a country that believes in free enterprise and democracy.").
109. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX EXPENDI-
TURES & SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 178-79 (1997).
110. See, e.g., JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI
GULCH: LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987);
TIMOTHY J. CONLAN ET AL., TAXING CHOICES: THE POLITICS OF TAX REFORM (1990).
But see Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, Doing Good or Doing Well?:
Congress and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 891 (1987) (reviewing
BIRNBAUMl & MURRAY, supra, and offering a less positive view of the motivations of
lawmakers).
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cation, child care, and relief for two-earner families; many popu-
lar entitlement programs could be reconstructed as such tax sub-
sidies relatively easily."' The ability to use refundable tax cred-
its (which would be necessary for absolute equivalence) would be
effectively limited under the McGinnis-Rappaport Amendment
because payments are considered as outlays for budget purposes
and thus would fall under the ninety percent cap. This design
limitation would not eliminate the use of tax credits to evade
supermajority votes, however. Middle-income Americans have
large enough tax liabilities, particularly when one includes pay-
roll taxes, to make nonrefundable tax credits an appealing way
to deliver benefits in a world where other spending is con-
strained.
112
The authors also argue that interest groups that do not now
seek their benefits in the form of tax subsidies must have chosen
their legislative sirategy because tax expenditures are more ex-
pensive for them to obtain than other spending."' That may be
the case in some instances, and perhaps a few of these groups
would drop out of the legislative market rather than turn their
attention to the tax code. Many others might not, particularly
when they realize that the more expensive tax subsidy is also
more durable than periodically appropriated discretionary
111. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax 'Benefits" Constitutionally Equivalent to Di-
rect Expenditures?, 112 HARV. L. REV. 379, 408 (1998) (noting "the ease with which
some tax programs can be reformulated as direct spending along entitlement lines,
as well as the ease with which such reformulation can occur in the opposite direc-
tion, i.e., entitlement spending can be transformed into tax policy").
112. The authors note that large reductions in businesses' taxes will prompt public
outrage. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 431. Again, the empirical as-
sumptions underlying this statement are unproven, but it is plausible that the public
will tolerate less in the way of generous tax subsidies for business than they will
accept for middle-income relief. For example, the enactment of the much criticized
alternative minimum tax responded to such public distaste. See 26 U.S.C. § 55
(1994). Many tax expenditures that make business investments more profitable can
be drafted to apply at the shareholder or owner level, however, leaving the tax lia-
bility of the business itself unaffected. Furthermore, if programs benefitting large
groups of the public take the form of unconstrained tax subsidies, more businesses
can receive federal money through traditional programs and remain below the 90%
cap.
113. Interestingly, however, the authors conclude in another passage that "there is
little evidence that transfers through regulation or tax preferences are more costly
than spending subsidies." McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 433 n.274.
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spending programs." 4 In other cases, groups have sought discre-
tionary money because they have developed relationships with
the relevant subcommittees and become accustomed to this par-
ticular method of financing without thinking about the compara-
tive advantages of tax subsidies." 5 Under the McGinnis-
Rappaport Amendment, these groups would consider forging
new relationships with members of the Senate Finance and
House Ways and Means Committees. Although these commit-
tees' wide jurisdiction may render them less susceptible to cap-
ture than the appropriations subcommittees," 6 individual com-
mittee members work to become affiliated with particular spe-
cial interests. Furthermore, congressional committee structure is
not exogenous. It can change to take account of shifts in other
rules and arrangements if change is in the interest of lawmak-
ers. One can imagine a jurisdictional arrangement in which tax
subsidies are placed either exclusively or concurrently within
the jurisdiction of the substantive committees." 7 Certainly, such
sweeping alterations in committees' jurisdictions are unlikely," 8
but a significant constitutional change such as the McGinnis-
Rappaport Amendment might be enough of a jolt to result in far-
reaching restructuring.
McGinnis and Rappaport agree that legislation establishing or
expanding tax expenditures is likely to increase after adoption of
their proposal, but they believe complete substitution is impossi-
ble."9 They conclude that the increase in spending through regu-
lations and tax subsidies "would be considerably smaller than
114. See Garrett, supra note 69, at 402-03; Zelinsky, supra note 111, at 401.
115. See, e.g., Lisa Scruggs, Tipping the Scales: Reexamining the Call for Expanded
Lobbying Restrictions (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discuss-
ing the reasons that members of the education lobby have chosen particular program
structures and describing their ability to shift their focus).
116. For the most convincing argument along these lines, see Edward A. Zelinsky,
James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax Ex-
penditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165 (1993).
117. See Garrett, supra note 69, at 437-42 (discussing possible reconfigurations of
committee structure that functional budgeting would entail).
118. See DAVID C. KING, TURF WARS: How CONGRESSIONAL COMMrrES CLA m JU-
RISDICTION 37-39 (1997) (explaining that shifts in committee jurisdiction are gradual
rather than abrupt or sweeping).
119. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 432-33.
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the reduction in special interest spending caused by the super-
majority rule."12° Certainly, to the extent that the McGinnis and
Rappaport Amendment increases the cost of spending-either
because groups must meet the higher costs of assembling
supermajority support or because they engage in costly evasive
tactics-there will be less government spending.121 I disagree,
however, that we can be sure that this reduction in spending
will be considerable. Among other things, experience with the
federal budget process over the last two decades demonstrates
the ingenuity of interest groups and lawmakers in obtaining fed-
eral benefits despite the hurdles placed in their path.'22
III.
Reform proposals-of the budget process or other areas of leg-
islative concern-can benefit from a close analysis of previous
experiences with similar proposals. Careful empirical work is
just as important as the kind of theoretical analysis that Profes-
sors McGinnis and Rappaport provide in their article and should
be part of the legal study of legislative procedures and congres-
sional behavior.
I offer the foregoing observations, criticisms, and questions to
serve two purposes. First, to suggest directions for the authors'
future work on this topic. Second, and more importantly per-
haps, to encourage them to reconsider their decision to frame
their proposal as a constitutional amendment. The breadth of
the federal budget allows interest groups to alter their behavior
to adapt to rules designed to restrict their ability to obtain feder-
al benefits. The sensitivity of the budget to economic and other
factors beyond the control of policymakers leads to a plethora of
120. 1& at 433.
121. Cf Steven G. Calabresi, "The Era of Big Government Is Over," 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1015, 1022-23 (1998) (reviewing ALAN BRINKLEY ET AL., NEW FEDERALIST PA-
PERS: ESSAYS IN DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTION (1997), and rejecting Brinkley's criti-
cisms of supermajority requirements for passing tax increases, contending that such
requirements would make it harder for special interests "to steal the wealth").
122. See generally Garrett, supra note 10 (detailing strategies groups use to evade
PAYGO requirements).
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unexpected consequences. For example, the current cash-flow
budget surplus-a surprise to most estimators, lawmakers, and
the public-is a consequence of a healthy economy much more
than it is a consequence of an effective budget structure. 123 Both
of these realities militate in favor of constructing flexible
decisionmaking structures.124
Finally, we should be wary of entrenching particular out-
comes. Decisions about how to allocate resources, like the vision
of a small federal government advocated by McGinnis and
Rappaport, are among the most fundamental political decisions
facing a polity and their representatives. 25 Certainly, the Con-
stitution is designed to entrench some governance decisions, in
particular important structural arrangements. 26 Nevertheless,
the durability of its provisions should lead us to think very care-
fully about the structures we constitutionalize, particularly
when less extreme responses along the procedural spectrum are
available. Fortunately, the challenging and engaging argument
made by Professors McGinnis and Rappaport in Supermajority
123. See Congressional Budget Office, The Economic & Budget Outlook: An Update,
Aug. 1998 (visited Jan. 1999) <http'J/www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfin?index=828&sequence=l>.
124. Interestingly, McGinnis and Rappaport recognize the need for flexibility in
some respects. They note that experience with their proposal may lead to the expan-
sion of supermajority rules to apply to other forms of spending like tax expenditures.
See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 433 n.273. Despite the possibility of
such an expansion of supermajority rules, McGinnis and Rappaport favor
incrementalism in constitutional reform. See adt I suggest simply that they consider
more modest reform, such as strengthening or changing congressional rules, before
they move to constitutional provisions.
125. See DONALD F. KETrL, DEFICIT POLITICS: PUBLIC BUDGETING IN ITS INSTrrU-
TIONAL & HISTORICAL CoNTExT 2 (1992); see also V.O. Key, The Lack of a
Budgetary Theory, 34 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 1137, 1138 (1940) ("The completed budget-
ary document... represents a judgment upon how scarce means should be allocat-
ed to bring the maximum return in social utility."). As Kettl explains:
Budgeting is the wind tunnel of American politics .... The study of the
budget reveals both the best and worst of the important institutions, pro-
cess, and policies of our national government. The budget is thus more
than a stay of decision making. It is a unique window into the very care
of American democracy.
KETTL, supra, at 2.
126. See Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrench-
ment and Retroactivity, 1987 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379, 391; Michael J. Klarman,
Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 509 &
n.81 (1997).
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Rules as a Constitutional Solution will doubtlessly be the cata-
lyst for further consideration of federal budget process reforms.
